mungiFWA

August 18, 2026

FWA: Pullers First

I am $FWA aligned and biased. This is my perspective on how FWA can mature as a protocol, not a prediction on the value of FWA or any sort of financial advice. read with love. reject my beliefs. help me find god (truth).

01Pullers matter more than anyone else

Every pull funds everyone elseWhere a pull's fee goes. ≈98% to depositors in equal shares, 1% to the crown pot, 1% to the protocol; at settlement, 10% of backing on the ≈96% of draws that sell back (the protocol's main capture) and 100% of that capture buys $FWA, 60% of which (under the package) flows back to pullers as epoch rebates. Nothing at the table is paid except by a pull. Full anatomy on the background page..

VRF prepay 1.04M gas at-cost Puller Pull fee backing × 1.025 pays Depositors · equal split ≈98% Crown pot · 1% 1% Protocol capture 1% cut + settlement take* * 10% of backing on sell-backs, from escrow at settlement; ≈26% of sell-backs are taken as $FWA (a market buy of the 90%; pays the tax) 1% $FWA buybacks 100% since Aug 6 '26 40% puller epochs 30% depositor rewards 30% burned epoch rebate — the 40% flows back to pullers (the reflexive loop) above: per-pull flows · below: token-market flows $FWA holders anyone trades $FWA market $1.5M / day OwnerSplitter initiator incentive 1% tax 80% team EOA 0x3b78… 10% EOA 0x8e59… 10% EOA 0xFc3C… capture buys $FWA here · the 30% burned shrinks supply for every holder

Depositors, the crown, the token, and the initiating team make money from pulls. Pullers are the scarce input, and pull demand is decaying. The entire ecosystem is dependent on someone deciding that one more pull is worth its price.

i believe fwa must fulfill the sustainable-pulling condition™️:

Players can justify a pull through what is returned to them and through the fun of pulling. Random-value incumbents show a different mix: slots return about 92.5 and ask the experience to carry the remaining 7.5; lotteries and collectibles ask non-cash value to carry much more.

Today FWA returns 92.2 of 100 points via cash floor, asset option value, and $FWA rebate. Fun is unknown, but given pulls are in decline, I expect fun does not currently fill the gap. We have not yet fulfilled the sustainable-pulling condition. My recommendation is broadly: focus on the puller. Fulfill the sustainable-pulling condition:

Step 1 · Tune the accounting for the puller

The cash floor and the $FWA rebate are somewhat tunable through accounting mechanisms. The House side is well supplied and well paidBy the numbers (the background page). The min-size churn seat annualizes ≈145% at day-29 pace, mostly $FWA rewards; a 1 ETH listing ≈26%; the crown takes ≈364 ETH/yr in tithe — a 121% APR against a ≈2%/yr chance of being drawn, ~60× what an ordinary listing of the same size earns. Rent, not incentive.. Today's protocol settings tax pullers to overpay others.

I recommend four parameter changes as one coordinated direction: move rent and token flow toward the scarce input (pullers).

configurations ?Today's configuration is dominated — three independent checks agree. (1) A sweep of 36 admin configurations (4 buyback routes × 3 trade-tax redirects × 3 surcharges, 365 days × 400 paths each) scored on capture, team income and pace; today's settings are beaten on every stored objective. (2) A re-run across 20 behavior cells (demand elasticity 1–8 × believer share 0–75%) in which the surcharge cut beats today's setting on token capture in every cell (+1 to +9%), and combined with the puller-heavier route by +3 to +120%. (3) An exact solve of the admin–depositor–puller game (pure Nash and the admin-commits case, cross-checked by a PSRO loop), which lands on a 1.5% surcharge and a 50% trade-tax redirect. Worked in the appendix.
1 · crown tithe
2 · surcharge
3 · trade tax to buybacks
4 · buyback route

Optimization 1 · Reduce the crown tithe fee: 1% → 0.25%

Optimization 2 · Reduce the surcharge fee: 2.5% → 1.5%

Optimization 3 · Redirect a portion of trade tax to buybacks: 50% redirect

Optimization 4 · Heavier route split towards pullers: 40/30/30 → 60/20/20, paired with 3

more details

What the tests say. The direct result is that the four changes move RTP from 92.2% to 97.6% at the stated calibration. Everything that follows from more pulling is conditional. Across the 20 behavioral cells, puller economics and token capture improve throughout; depositor and team outcomes depend on elasticity, token realization, and whether trade volume scales. The exact game solve agrees on the direction of the price levers but not on where participation settles.

One and two remove rent. The crown's titheThe biggest listing in the pool. Today CryptoPunk #6721 at 300 ETH. On top of its normal fee share it receives an extra 1% of every pull's fee (the tithe). Anyone can take the crown by depositing 10% more (330 ETH). Caveat: the simulation freezes pool composition, so it cannot say whether a smaller tithe changes who holds the crown or the tail of the backing distribution; the arithmetic here is on today's pool. pays ~60× what a listing that size earns on its ownThe risk the tithe is paid for. Selection per pull = 1 ÷ (300 × Σ1/backing); × today's pace ≈ 2%/yr. A 300 ETH listing without the crown earns ≈2%/yr from its equal fee share — so the tithe is ~60× what the same seat earns on its own.; at 0.25% the seat still yields ≈30%0.25% of every pull's fee on 300 ETH. ≈91 ETH/yr → ≈30% APR — ~15× the ordinary alternative and ample to keep the 330-ETH takeover race alive. The other ≈270 ETH/yr goes back to the equal split across every depositor. (≈50% at the package's pace) and ≈270 ETH/yr goes back to every other depositor. The surcharge adds almost nothing to protocol capture (~90% of capture is settlement takeWhere capture actually comes from. 10% of backing on the 96% of draws that sell back (measured, trailing 7 days), plus the 1% acquisition cut. The surcharge is a markup on the pull price that flows to depositors, not to capture — cutting it changes what pullers pay, not what the token earns.) and comes straight out of RTP. Cutting it pays pullers directly20 behavior cells. Demand elasticity 1–8 × believer share 0–75%, 365 days. The surcharge cut alone lifts token capture +1 to +9% in every cell; combined with the puller-heavier route, +3 to +120% — never once losing on capture or pace. Worked in the appendix.; because the surcharge is part of the fee depositors split, it also trims depositor fee flow by ≈1% — which Optimizations 1 and 3 more than replace.

Three and four move the token's money toward pullers — and only work together. The 1% trade tax (≈$15k/day) goes to the initiating teamVerified from source. The hook routes 100% of the tax to an owner-set feeAddress — the OwnerSplitter (0x7400…ec04), which pays 80/10/10 to three fixed EOAs. The core source states the LP 1% fee “is never included” in buybacks. Redirecting all of it is one setFeeAddress(FWAToken) transaction — the token accepts ETH and its permissionless buyback() spends any balance; redirecting half needs a small forwarding contract (the OwnerSplitter's recipients and 80/10/10 are compile-time constants) plus that transaction. as an incentive; sending half of it to buybacks feeds the flywheel. Sending 60% of buybacks to pullers (instead of 40%) is what carries RTP mechanically to 97.6%. The chart's pace increase is the paper's behavioral scenario, not a contract output. That 60% comes partly out of the depositors' share of buybacks (30% → 20%). The redirect makes up the differenceWhy the pair. The route takes a third of the depositor reward leg (30% → 20% of buybacks); the redirect grows the buyback pool by ~40%. At unchanged pace, depositor acquisition economics land near the current case. If pace responds as assumed, depositors move ahead; if it does not, the route remains partly a transfer toward pullers. Without the redirect, the new route is more clearly a transfer from depositors to pullers (4 without 3, above). The buyback route is also the setting I would expect to re-tune as the pool matures.

What three costs the team. Half of the trade tax at whatever future token-trading volume actually occurs. That cost is direct; the payback is conditional. The scenario rangeTwo operating assumptions, neither a forecast. With $FWA trade volume fixed in ETH, the recommended configuration puts modeled team fee income near 1,500 ETH/yr. If token volume instead scales with the model's capitalization scenario, it reaches roughly 5,100 ETH/yr. The model does not establish which volume path will occur, or whether higher RTP will create enough incremental pulling to offset the redirected tax. is roughly 1,500–5,100 ETH/yr. I still favor the trade because moving money toward pullers improves the transaction the entire system depends on, not because the model proves a demand response.

Under the paper's central scenario, every seat but the crown moves up, and the crown stays well paid.

Per pull, the four changes move the right side of the sustainable-pulling condition from 92.2 to 97.6 at spot: the cash floor from 87.6 to 88.5 (the surcharge cut), the $FWA rebate from 4.2 to 8.7. At 97.6%What 97.6% is, and what it assumes. Return to the puller under Optimizations 1–4, built as 88.5 cash floor (90% of the drawn backing, in escrow) + 0.4 asset option value (kept draws at par) + 8.7 $FWA rebate valued at spot. It assumes gas at ≈0.1 gwei (a 1-gwei day takes ≈2 points off) and ≈$1.5M/day of $FWA trading (the redirected-tax leg is 2.4 points at that volume, ≈1.1 at the ≈$0.7M/day seen on Aug 18). The like-for-like comparison with a slot's cash return is the 88.9% before the token — the floor plus kept draws. The background page gives every basis and the gas and volume bands. FWA would offer the best odds in random-value markets. This is a meaningful step towards a more sustainable puller ecosystem, but there's still gap to be filled by more FUN and more asset option value.

Step 2 · Open the House to curated, user-created pools

Today FWA is one pool. Pullers take the pool as they find it: one price, one set of odds, one shared set of assets. The puller who wants a punk and the one who wants a 0.0001 ETH spinny share the same table (in practice, people just don't play as a result of this limitation). Meanwhile optimal game play for depositors is to put junk in the pool, worsening the expected value for any player.

The current, single-pool-system’s end state is death.

Curated, user-created pools fixes this. This future has some flexibility, but in my mind the protocol stays what it is: escrowed backing, a draw no participant can rig, a guaranteed cash bid, a cut that buys $FWA. Anyone can create a poolThe new seat. A host chooses what a pool lists (a collection, a brand's drop, a theme, a floor of illiquid assets), what it charges, and how it is curated; the protocol supplies escrow, the draw, the bid and the buyback. Hosts are the fourth seat in Model 2 — how they are paid is Optimization 5. alongside the core one; they all share these same traits. The key change is competition: one House becomes n Houses, all competing for pullers. Pools compete for players on price, odds, variety, asset value, and fun.

READ:
ASSET-OPTION VALUE:🆙
FUN: 🆙
RTP: 🆙
PULLERS: ERECT

Everyone downstream does better because more pulling happens: the depositor bloc earns more fee flow, capture rises so the token is worth more, hosts are paid to curate, and the token becomes an index on every random-value market settled through FWA, not just one pool's take. Team is working on this (at least directionally). bullish. I put extreme weight on its importance.

Step 3 · Exit the team

The third recommendation is to kick these bums to the curb (jk ilr&t). But there are two reasons why, over time, i think we need them to leave:

It removes a rent from users. Today a flat 1% on every $FWA trade pays team wallets as a builder's incentive. Directionally good for now, but long term, any point that can be taken from here can be used to push puller RTP towards 100%. The ideal protocol end state is a system that is all but rent free. PULLERS MATTER MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE.

It mitigates some of FWA's exposure to shutdown. FWA today has a keyWhat the owner key can do today, from verified source. Set the surcharge (uncapped), the settlement payout (80–95%), both protocol fee cuts (the acquisition cut up to 100%), the crown share and threshold, the buyback share (protocolFeeToTokenBps), the buyback route, and the trade-tax destination (setFeeAddress); flip RETAINED_TO_PROTOCOL so the 10% sell-back take goes to depositors instead of the protocol — with the buyback share at 0 that zeroes the token's capture in two transactions; gate deposits by collection whitelist; disable acquisitions or put the protocol into withdraw-only; disable external buys on the hook (a sell-only market); repoint the VRF coordinator — and that one has teeth: the fulfil callback checks only that the caller is the coordinator, so a repointed coordinator lets the owner supply the random word once the pool is idle. The owner is exempt from the token's transfer lock (and holds ≈19.5M $FWA); the VRF-service owner can withdraw its surplus and the Chainlink subscription owner can cancel it and recover the ≈79 ETH of puller prepay it holds. No timelock guards any of it; one EOA owns all seven contracts and the subscription. The key cannot touch listing escrow or fee credit, seize the crown pot, mint, upgrade, or change the 1% hook fee. The config history shows several of these have been used. The trade tax itself pays three fixed team wallets via the OwnerSplitter. that in practice can switch the game off. Discretionary operator control is a regulatory and governance surface that we must think about. If we properly decentralize, no key can stop the game. no government can stop the game. i am not an anal but believe this is a structurally soundNot legal advice — a structural reading. Reducing discretionary powers removes a concentrated control surface; it does not determine legal status. Front-ends, promoters and pool hosts can remain identifiable surfaces, users carry their jurisdictions' rules, and an immutable protocol still depends on Ethereum and Chainlink VRF. FinCEN guidance, the Ooki DAO decision, securities analysis based on managerial efforts, and gambling rules all show that immutability or distributed governance does not by itself remove operator, promoter, host, securities, gambling or AML exposure. Specialist review is required before relying on this strategy. approach to mitigating much of this risk.

I say this with caveats. I believe these three things have to be true for the protocol's success:

  • The team must not leave now. i suspect FWA would die fairly quickly without tokenworks leadership, in the short term. there is important coordination and iteration that requires this specific team.
  • We must maintain incentives for the team. per #1, we need the team. if team is not properly incentivized, #1 is moot. if fwa is massive, the team should be rewarded accordingly. incentives are important.
  • The team must not over-extract now. fees that pay a team before the market exists suffocate the market. this is a big part of why i think a portion of trade tax should be redirected pronto.

Optimization 6 · Exit the team, on a schedule

I think an interesting path is for the team to commit to a scheduleAn instance, not a spec. Team share of the 1% trade tax: 100% today → 50% now (Optimization 3) → 25% in year 3 → 12.5% in year 5 → a few percent by year 8, decaying toward zero (whether it ever reaches zero, or holds a small floor, is a governance choice), every surrendered point routed to buybacks. On the calibrated model year one pays the team ≈5,100 ETH (≈1,500 with volume fixed in ETH), the same as Optimization 3; puller RTP at spot rises from 97.6% toward 100.0% as the schedule runs. The steps and the horizon are governance choices; what matters is that the schedule is enforced by the routing contract, not promised. where their take of the trade tax fee decays over time towards (but not to) 0, immediately reducing it now to subsidize pulls and over time moving towards a near-rent-free protocol-stateWhat the model shows, exactly. Under optimizations 1–4 the guaranteed part of a pull is 88.9 points and the rebate 8.7 at spot, of which 2.4 come from the redirected half of the trade tax. Each further point of the tax that moves to buybacks scales that leg: 50% → 97.6%, 75% → 98.8%, 87.5% → 99.4%, 100% → 100.0% at today's pace and volume — the break-even belief falls from 1.28× spot to 1.0×. Computed in sim/rtp_decomp.ts.; the team maintains long term incentives with this approach.

02tldr

Pullers matter more than anyone else in the ecosystem.

Through four parameter changes, FWA can lift player RTP upwards of 97.6%. I believe that this set of tradeoffs (cutting the crown's tithe fee, cutting the surcharge, redirecting a portion of the trade tax to buybacks, and giving pullers a higher route split of buybacks) is worth it, and that in exchange for any cuts the crown, depositors, or the team face through these configuration changes, those blocs will make up for it through a more sustainable pull pace.

I am most bullish on curated, user-created pools. It changes the protocol from one monolithic House into a market of Houses where any individual House competes to give players access to pricing, RTP, quality, variety, and fun. This is the most critical change, in my opinion, and the team seems to be working on it as is. That’s great. user-created pools deserves a lot of attention/discussion. I’d opt for the set of 4 parameter changes as mentioned above in any case.

Finally, I think it’s best if the team exits on a schedule where their take reduces towards 0 on purpose (removing a rent from users and one regulatory surface from the protocol).

This is all just my opinion ofc, could all be wrong. I welcome and encourage disagreement and discourse.